BOOK REVIEWS
Studying Law. Edited by Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New York: Washington Square
Pub. Co., 1945. Pp. viii, 753. $4.75.
The selections in this book speak for themselves. There is sound advice to the beginning student and the young lawyer from Albert J. Beveridge, serious and religious, with little reference to the sparkle and originality that contributed to the
greatness of John Marshall. There is Zane's informative essay, "The Five Ages of the
Bench and Bar of England," reprinted from Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History. There are some two hundred pages, called "Elements of Law," by Munroe
Smith. These include an essay on jurisprudence by him but consist mostly of the
editor's notes on lectures by Professor Smith. Apart from the reprinted essay, this is a
panoramic history of law with about ninety pages devoted to English and American
law. Again, the material is helpful and informative.
Dean Pound is represented by an outline "Introduction to American Law," his
noteworthy "Survey of Social Interests," and the essay on "Interpretation of Statutes"
written as an introduction to Professor de Sloovere's Cases on the Interpretationof
Statutes. Professor Wambaugh's "How To Use Decisions and Statutes" is reprinted
from Cooley on Brief Making; and with it goes Professor Goodhart's useful and well
known essay, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case."
A lively and stimulating note is contributed by Dean Wigmore's "Jury-Trial
Rules of Evidence in the Next Century." The editor includes his own survey of
opinions on "Prelegal Education," drawn from a Report to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association made in September,
i944. Finally there is a reprint from Mr. Charles B. Stephens' Report of the Special
Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar of the American Bar Association,
1945, giving a useful brief analysis of the factors which one may consider in determining where to begin his work as a lawyer.
The selection is sober and should contribute to a student's sense of security. For
those mature young men who are now entering law schools it would seem more useful
to emphasize the relationship between the still problematical social developments of
the day and the developing law. The reviewer would prefer, for an introduction to law,
a selection arranged around Maine's chapter on Contract in Ancient Law, Dean
Pound's "The New Feudalism," and selections from the Rushcliffe Report.
MALCOLM SHAPP*

Algunos aspectos de la doctrina del derecho en Kant. By Alfredo M. Egusquiza.
Buenos Aires: Los Talleres Graficos d'Accurzio, 1945. Pp. 96.
This little brochure of some thirteen thousand words falls into three approximately
equal parts, consisting of an "objective" presentation of the logical essence of (i)
Kant's theoretical philosophy, (2) Kant's practical philosophy, and (3) certain aspects
of Kant's philosophy of right. The first two-thirds are presented, not so much for their
own sake, as because they supply an indispensable frame of reference for the third
part, which alone corresponds to the title of the work.
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The third part simply follows Kant's own attempts to apply his philosophical
principles to the subject of jurisprudence, distinguishing sharply the moral and judicial
points of view, showing on what grounds compulsion and external necessity properly
form a part of justice, on what grounds the social contract can be regarded as a normative idea, and how far and why Kant's conception of a kingdom of ends is significant
for a philosophical understanding of jurisprudence.
Throughout, the author abstains from historical explanation of any sort, from discussion of alternative scholarly interpretations, and from thrusting himself in any way
into the picture he presents. We are offered, quite simply, the distilled essence of Kant's
own words, with the thought that (i) they form a consistent system of inter-implying
propositions, and (2) that it is worth while to present them in this way at this time.
There is just a suggestion that commentators who have ventured to criticize Kant's
attempt to apply his philosophy to matters of jurisprudence have failed to render
complete justice to the severe consistency of the philosopher's thought.
Precisely for what class of readers this careful condensation of Kant's thought is intended, remains undetermined. It can hardly be designed for beginners, whether in the
study of philosophy or in the study of law. To appreciate the objective accuracy, and
indeed to apprehend the philosophical significance, of the author's severely condensed
account, a reader would have to be pretty well acquainted already with Kant's work.
Could it be intended for use as a sort of source book, containing accurate material for
discussion, interpretation, and development by more advanced students, working
under a yet moreadvanced scholarly leader? For full appreciation of its significance,
the work surely cries out for some such expansion and interpretative development.
As to how he would like his brochure to be understood and used, the author keeps
his own counsel. In the severely modest and limited problem he has set himself, of
presenting an objectively accurate sketch of Kant's system in its relation to jurisprudence, he has doubtless been successful. But how far, and for what purposes, such a
sketch, however accurate, is worth publishing at the present day, remains a question.
Any university library, for instance, contains on its shelves some such book as
Caird's Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, published originally in 3889, Caird's
account (vol. II, pp. 292-350) contains, not merely Kant's views presented in his own
way, but also a distinguished interpretation in terms of the principles of modem
idealism. This goes beyond the letter of Kant's words and-corrects certain mechanical
weaknesses of Kant's excessively abstract logic. It brings out sympathetically the full
.significance of the Kantian message. There are several similarly helpful and reliable
treatments in all modern languages; and they are all pretty well known. The present
reviewer has no doubt that the author of this brochure is well acquainted with what
every university library has on its shelves, and that he must himself realize that he is
in no way adding anything whatever to the extant literature on Kant. What he has
published might, conceivably, be regarded as a reliable reference book for advanced
students of jurisprudence. But, in that case, would it not be still better for them to refer
to some one of the many extant treatments which provide, not only the evidence, but
a positive and constructive interpretation of it?
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